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Abstract—We present two attacks on two different versions of
physical layer cryptography schemes based on massive multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO). Both cryptosystems employ a
singular value decomposition (SVD) precoding technique. For
the first one, we show that the eavesdropper (who knows its
own channel and the channel between legitimate users) can
decrypt the information data under the same condition as the
legitimate receiver. We study the signal-to-noise advantage ratio
for decoding by the legitimate user over the eavesdropper in
a more generalized scheme when an arbitrary precoder at the
transmitter is employed. On the negative side, we show that if
the eavesdropper uses a number of receive antennas much larger
than the number of legitimate user antennas, then there is no
advantage, independent of the precoding scheme employed at the
transmitter. On the positive side, for the case where the adversary
is limited to have the same number of antennas as legitimate
users, we give an O (n2) upper bound on the advantage and show
that this bound can be approached using an inverse precoder.
For the second cryptosystem, we show that the required security
conditions prevent the legitimate user from decoding the plain-
text uniquely.
Index Terms—Physical Layer Cryptography, Massive MIMO,
Precoding, Zero-Forcing Linear Receiver.
I. INTRODUCTION
Background. Since the pioneering theoretical study of the
“wiretap channel” by Wyner [18], various techniques for
achieving secure communication have been proposed based
on physical assumptions on the communication channel. These
methods, known as “physical layer security”, ensure that the
communication channel between the legitimate parties is suf-
ficiently “different” from the channel between the legitimate
parties and the adversaries. Since such methods do not assume
an existing shared secret key between legitimate parties, nor
require the secure storage of any secret key, they offer a
potential physical alternative in some applications to classical
software-based cryptographic techniques such as public-key
cryptography [5]. In the context of wireless communications,
such methods have the novel feature of replacing the role of the
secret key needed for decryption in classical cryptosystems,
with the physical location of the legitimate receiver’s antennas,
so that security should be achieved against an adversary whose
antennas are located in a sufficiently different location (the
difference in location typically need only be significant with
respect to the signal wavelength; thus for microwave commu-
nication, only a very small distance would already guarantee
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security). Unfortunately, to achieve their information-theoretic
security properties, most existing physical layer security tech-
niques need to assume significant additional limitations on
the resources or capability of the adversary, which may not
be realistic in many practical applications; for example, the
techniques in [11] assume that the signal-to-noise ratio in the
adversary’s channel is smaller than the signal-to-noise ratio
in the legitimate receiver channel, while MIMO “jamming”
techniques such as those based on “artificial noise” [7], [8]
need to assume that the number of receiving antennas used by
the adversary n′r is smaller than the number of transmitting
antennas nt or the number of receiving antennas nr of the
legitimate sender and receiver, respectively.
Recently, an interesting new approach for physical security
in massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) communi-
cation systems was introduced by Dean and Goldsmith [2], [3]
and called “Physical layer cryptography”, or a massive MIMO
physical layer cryptosystem (MMPLC). In this scenario, the
channel state information (CSI) is known at the legitimate
transmitter as well as all the other adversaries and legitimate
receivers. The eavesdropper has also the knowledge of the CSI
between legitimate users. To achieve such a goal, the authors
of [2], [3] precode the information data at the transmitter,
based on the known CSI between the legitimate users, so that
the decoding of the received vector would be computationally
easy for the legitimate user but computationally hard for the
adversary. The above assumptions on the channel conditions
seem to be deliberately created for MMPLC and not raised
naturally from the physical of the channels. First, use of SVD
beamforming with a constellation with the same spacing be-
tween the constellation points does not appear to be technically
sound, given that perfect CSI is available at the transmitter.
Second, the asymptotic in nt and/or nr with perfect CSI is
of no interest, because even if a system with ever increasing
number of antennas could be built, finite channel coherence
will limit the number of dimensions that can be trained and
eventually break the perfect-CSI assumption.
The main idea in [2], [3] is to replace the information-
theoretic security guarantees of previous physical layer se-
curity methods with the weaker complexity-based security
guarantees used in cryptography. More precisely, the goal
of [2], [3] is to show that the adversary cannot decode the
sent message (using efficient “Signal Processing” techniques)
due to computational complexity barriers associated to the
available massive MIMO decoding algorithms. This approach
trades-off a weaker, but still practical, complexity-based secu-
rity guarantee in order to avoid the less practical additional
assumptions required by existing information-theoretic tech-
niques, such as stronger noise level in [11], [12], [13], [16],
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2[15] and/or less antennas for the adversary than for legitimate
parties in [7], [8], while still retaining the “no secret key”
location-based decryption feature of physical-layer security
methods. For a survey on physical layer security for massive
MIMO see [14].
In [2], a MMPLC− 13 is presented that is claimed to
achieve the above goal of the complexity-based approach,
using a singular value decomposition (SVD) precoding tech-
nique and m-PAM constellations at the transmitter. Namely,
it is claimed that, under a certain condition on the number nt
of legitimate sender’s transmit antennas and the noise level
β in the adversary’s channel (which we call the hardness
condition of MMPLC− 13), the message decoding and dis-
tinguishing problems for the adversary (eavesdropper), termed
the MIMO− Search and MIMO− Decision problem in [2],
respectively, are as hard to solve on average as it is to solve
a standard conjectured hard lattice problem in dimension nt
in the worst-case, in particular, the GapSVPpoly(nt) variant of
the approximate shortest vector problem in arbitrary lattices
of dimension nt, with approximation factor polynomial in
nt. For these problems, no polynomial-time algorithm is
known, and the best known algorithms run in time exponential
in the number of transmit antennas nt, which is typically
infeasible when nt is in the range of few hundreds (as in
the case of massive MIMO). Significantly, this computational
hardness of MIMO− Decision is claimed to hold even if the
adversary is allowed to use a large number of receive antennas
n′r = poly(nt) polynomially larger than nt and nr used by
the legitimate parties, and with the same noise level as the
legitimate receiver (β = α). Consequently, under the widely
believed conjecture that no polynomial-time algorithms for
GapSVPpoly(nt) in dimension nt exist and the hardness condi-
tion of [2], the authors of [2] conclude that their MMPLC− 13
and the corresponding MIMO− Decision problem is secure
against adversaries with run-time polynomial in nt.
In [3], MMPLC− 17 is provided, which is basically same
as MMPLC− 13 and claimed to achieve the complexity-based
security based on a weaker hardness assumption and different
security conditions. In particular, it is shown that, under two
certain conditions (different from that in MMPLC− 17) on
the number nt of legitimate sender’s transmit antennas, the
number nr of legitimate user’s receive antennas, and the
constellation size m, the message decoding problem (the
MIMO− Search problem in [3]) for the adversary, is as hard to
solve on average as (above mentioned) lattice problems in di-
mension nt in the worst-case. We call the latter two conditions,
the hardness conditions of MMPLC− 17. Note that there are
two differences between MMPLC− 13 and MMPLC− 17: (i)
first there is only one hardness condition in MMPLC− 13,
while there are two other hardness conditions in MMPLC− 17
both different from MMPLC− 13, (ii) the cryptosystem in [2]
is claimed to be secure since both MIMO− Search and hence
MIMO− Decision are hard, but the security of the scheme
in [2] is base on the hardness of MIMO− Search only.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we further analyse the
complexity-based MMPLC− 13 and MMPLC− 17 initiated
in [2], [3], to improve the understanding of their potential and
limitations. Our contributions are summarized below:
• Security of MMPLC− 13 is flawed. Using a linear
receiver known as zero-forcing (ZF) [10], a well-known
and efficient Signal-Processing algorithm with run-time
polynomial in nt, we show that MIMO− Search problem
defined in [2] can be solved efficiently under an extra
condition on the number of receive antennas. We analyse
the decoding success probability of this algorithm and
prove that it is ≥ 1− o(1) even if the hardness condition
of MMPLC− 13 is satisfied, if the ratio y′ = n′r/nt
exceeds a small factor at most logarithmic in nt, i.e. y′ =
O(log nt) asymptotically. This contradicts the hardness of
the MIMO− Search problem conjectured in [2] to hold
for much larger polynomial ratios y′ = O(poly(nt)).
Note the number of transmit antennas nt is considered
as the security parameter of MMPLC− 13, and hence
the number of receive antennas in the employed massive
MIMO is in the order of few hundreds. This justifies
the reason why we derived and discussed asymptotic
results on MMPLC− 13. Moreover, we show that the
decoding success probability of an adversary against the
MMPLC− 13 of [2] using the ZF decoder is approxi-
mately the same (or greater than) as the decoding success
probability of the legitimate receiver using a maximum-
likelihood ML decoder if n′r is approximately greater
than or equal to nr, assuming an equal noise level for
adversary and legitimate receivers. Our first contribution
implies that the SVD precoder-based MM− PLC in [2]
still requires for security an undesirable assumption lim-
iting n′r to be less than that of the legitimate receiver,
similar to previous information-theoretic techniques.
• MMPLC− 17 is cryptographically incorrect. We show
that, by combining the two hardness conditions of
MMPLC− 17 in [3] for nt, nr, and m, we derive a
new condition (based upon only nt and m) which implies
that the legitimate user cannot uniquely decode the sent
message independent of its updated security argument
compared to MMPLC− 13. In particular, if x is sent, we
show that the legitimate user can not uniquely decode to
x, as x+e1, where e1 denote the unit vector with a single
1 in the first coordinate and 0 elsewhere, is statistically
close to x.
• Potential of MMPLC. As last contribution, we investigate
the potential of the general approach of [2] and [3]
by studying the generalized scenario where one allows
arbitrary precoding matrices by the legitimate transmitter
in place of the SVD precoder. To do so, we define a
decoding advantage ratio for the legitimate user over
the adversary, which is approximately the ratio of the
maximum noise power tolerated by the legitimate user’s
decoder to the maximum noise power tolerated by the
adversary’s decoder (for the same “high” success proba-
bility). We derive a general upper bound on this advantage
ratio, and show that, even in the general scenario, the
advantage ratio tends to 1 (implying no advantage), if
the ratio n′r/max(nt, nr) exceeds a small constant factor
(≤ 9). We further show that user B has essentially no
decoding advantage over user E when user E has the
same (or bigger) number of receiving antennas. Thus
3a linear limitation (in the number of legitimate user
antennas) on the number of adversary antennas seems
inherent to the security of this approach. On the positive
side, we show that, in the case when legitimate parties
and the adversary all have the same number of antennas
(n′r = nr = nt), the upper bound on the advantage
ratio is quadratic in nt. We give both theoretical and
experimental evidences that this upper bound can be
achieved using an inverse precoder instead of SVD pre-
coder. Notice that, we neither introduce a new precoder
(in the sense of Telecommunication theory) nor a new
cryptosystem through inverse precoder. Instead, we use
this power-inefficient precoder to only show the sharp-
ness/achievability of our bounds on advantage ratio. In
particular, we study the distribution of the quotient of two
Gaussian matrices and its least singular value. We further
derive the distribution of the diagonal elements of an
upper triangular matrix obtained in the QR decomposition
of the mentioned quotient matrix. These results enable
us to define and derive explicitly the decoding advantage
ratio for the legitimate user over the adversary equipped
with a successive interference cancellation SIC decoder.
Remark 1: Note that the first bullet of the above mentioned
contributions is also published in [4]. The second and third
contributions in Sections IV and V, are completely new
compared to what is presented in [4].
Notation. The notation a b denotes that the real number a
is much greater than b. We let |z| denotes the absolute value
of z. Vectors will be column-wise and denoted by bold small
letters. Let v be a vector, then its j-th entry is represented
by vj . A k1 × k2 matrix X = [x1, . . . ,xk2 ] is formed by
joining the k1-dimensional column vectors x1, . . . ,xk2 . The
superscript t denotes transposition operation. We make use
of the standard Landau notations to classify the growth of
functions. We say that a function F (n) is poly(n) if it is
bounded by a polynomial in n. The notation ω(F (n)) refers
to the set of functions (or an arbitrary function in that set)
growing faster than cF (n) for any constant c > 0. A function
G(n) is said negligible if it is proportional to n−ω(1). If
x is a random variable and E is a set, P[E] denotes the
probability of the event “x ∈ E”. The expected value and
variance of a random variable x is denoted by E[x] and V[x],
respectively. The standard Gaussian distribution on R with
zero mean and variance σ2 is denoted by Nσ2 . We denote
by w ←↩ D the assignment to random variable w a sample
from the probability distribution D. The statistical distance
(SD) between distributions D1 and D2 over a domain E is
∆(D1,D2) = 1
2
∫
E
|D1(x)−D2(x)|dx.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We first summarize the notion of real lattices and SVD (of
a matrix) which are essential for the rest of the paper. A k-
dimensional lattice Λ with a basis set {`1, . . . , `k} ⊆ Rd is
the set of all integer linear combinations of basis vectors. Let
L be a matrix with `m as its columns, 1 ≤ m ≤ k, then L is
called the generator matrix of the lattice ΛL. The determinant
of a ΛL is defined as
det(ΛL) ,
√
det(LhL),
where Lh denote the Hermitian transposition of the matrix L.
For any lattice ΛL, the minimum distance of λ1(ΛL) is the
smallest Euclidean distance between any two lattice points.
Let s ≥ t, then every matrix Ms×t admits a singular value
decomposition (SVD) M = UΣVt, where the matrices Us×t
and Vt×t are two orthogonal matrices and Σt×t is a rect-
angular diagonal matrix with non-negative diagonal elements
σ1(M) ≥ · · · ≥ σs(M). By abusing the notation, we denote
the Moore–Penrose pseudo-inverse of M by M−1, that is
VΣ−1Ut, where the pseudo-inverse of Σ is denoted by Σ−1
and can be obtained by taking the reciprocal of each non-zero
entry on the diagonal of Σ and finally transposing the matrix.
We note that the construction in [2] and [3] are the same
and only the hardness conditions are different. Therefore, we
first recall the system model of [2], [3] and then present the
correctness condition (although not given in either) and finally
study the hardness (security) conditions of each separately.
A. Dean-Goldsmith Model
We consider a slow-fading MIMO wiretap channel model as
in Fig. 1. The nr×nt real-valued MIMO channel from user A
to user B is denoted by H. We also denote the channel from
A to the adversary E by an n′r × nt matrix G. The entries of
H and G are identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.)
based on a Gaussian distribution N1. We also assume that
H and G are independent as the geographical location of
legitimate user and the adversary are different. These channel
matrices are assumed to be constant for long time as we
employ precoders at the transmitter. This model can be written
as: {
y = Hx + e,
y′ = Gx + e′.
The entries xi of x ∈ Rnt , for 1 ≤ i ≤ nt, are drawn
from a constellation X = {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1} for an integer
m. We assume that x satisfies an average power constraint
E(‖x‖2) = ρ. The components of the noise vectors e and e′
are i.i.d. based on Gaussian distributions Nm2α2 and Nm2β2 ,
respectively. We assume α = β ∈ (0, 1) to evaluate the
potential of the Dean-Goldsmith model to provide security
based on computational complexity assumptions, without a
“degraded noise” assumption on the eavesdropper. In this
Fig. 1. The block diagram of a MIMO wiretap channel. The channel between
user A and user B (legitimate users) is denoted byH. The matrixG represents
the channel between user A and the adversary E.
communication setup, the CSI is available at all the transmitter
4and receivers. In fact, users A and B know the channel matrix
H (via some channel identification process), while adversary
E has the knowledge of both channel matrices G and H. The
knowledge of H allows A to perform a linear precoding to the
message before transmission. More specifically, in [2], [3], to
send a message x to B, user A performs an SVD precoding
as follows. Let SVD of H be given as H = UΣVt. The user
A transmits Vx instead of x and B applies a filter matrix Ut
to the received vector y. With this, the received vectors at B
and E are as follows:{
y˜ = Σx + e˜,
y′ = GVx + e′,
where e˜ = Ute. Note that since Ut and V are both orthogonal
matrices, the vector e˜ and the matrix Gv , GV continue to
be i.i.d. Gaussian vector and matrix, with components of zero
mean and variances m2α2 and 1, respectively.
B. Correctness Condition
Although Dean-Goldsmith do not provide a correctness
analysis in either of [2] and [3], we provide one here for
completeness. Since Σ = diag(σ1(H), . . . , σnt(H)) is diago-
nal, user B recovers an estimate x˜i of the i-th coordinate/layer
xi of x, by performing two operations dividing and rounding
as follows:
x˜i = dy˜i/σi(H)c = xi + de˜i/σi(H)c .
Note that nr ≥ nt, unless otherwise σnt(H) = 0. It
is now easy to see that the decoding process succeeds if
|e˜i| < |σi(H)|/2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ nt. Since each e˜i is
distributed as Nm2α2 , the decoding error probability, P [B|H]
that B incorrectly decodes x conditioned on a fixed H, is, by
a union bound, upper bounded by nt times the probability of
decoding error at the worst layer:
P [B|H] ≤ ntPw←↩Nm2α2 [|w| > |σnt(H)|/2] (1)
= ntPw←↩N1 [|w| > |σnt(H)|/(2mα)] (2)
≤ nt exp
(−|σnt(H)|2/ (8m2α2)) , (3)
where we have used the bound exp(−x2/2) on the tail of the
standard Gaussian distribution. By choosing α such that
α2 ≤ |σnt(H)|2/
(
8m2 log(nt/ε)
)
,
one can ensure that B’s error probability P [B|H] is less than
any ε > 0.
Remark 2: The number of transmit antenna’s nt is defined
as the security parameter (commonly used by cryptographers,
see [19]) in both [2] and [3]. This means that the system’s
correctness and security depend asymptotically on nt. In
particular, the system is called correct if user B can decode
x correctly with overwhelming probability ≥ 1 − n−ct , for a
positive constant c. Furthermore, decoding x for E is hard (or
the system is called computationally secure) if there exists no
efficient decoding algorithm for E, whose its run-time is within
some polynomial factor of nt. For more details on the exact
definitions of computational correctness and security, please
refer to [19].
C. Security Condition of the Cryptosystem in [2]
Unlike decoding by user B, for decoding by the adversary
E, the authors of [2] claimed that the complexity of a problem
called in [2] the “Decision” variant of the “MIMO decoding
problem” (to be called MIMO− Decision from here on),
namely distinguishing between samples of two distribution
Am,α and Rα both defined on Rnt × R. The first one is the
distribution of the channel coefficients and the received signal
from a single antenna in a MIMO channel. Since there are nr
receive antenna, there will be nr samples of Am,α. The second
one is basically going to be identical to the first one lacking the
underlying structure. The authors of [2] then claimed a security
reduction to MIMO− Search problem, that is recovering x
from y′ = Gvx + e′ and Gv , with non-negligible probability,
under certain parameter settings, upon using massive MIMO
systems with large number of transmit antennas nt. And finally
they claimed that the MIMO− Search is as hard as solving
standard lattice problems in the worst-case. More precisely, it
was claimed in [2] that, upon considering above conditions,
user E will face an exponential complexity in decoding the
message x. For our security analysis, we focus here for
simplicity on this MIMO− Search variant. We say that the
MIMO− Search problem is hard (and the MMPLC− 13 is
secure in the sense of “one-wayness”) if any attack algorithm
against MIMO− Search with run-time poly(nt) has negligible
success probability n−ω(1)t . More precisely, in Theorem 1
of [2], a polynomial-time complexity reduction is claimed
from worst-case instances of the GapSVPnt/α problem in
arbitrary lattices of dimension nt, to the MIMO− Search
problem with nt transmit antennas, noise parameter α and
constellation size m, assuming the following minimum noise
level for the equivalent channel in between A and E holds:
mα >
√
nt. (4)
The reduction is quantum when m = poly(nt) and classical
when m = O(2nt), and is claimed to hold for any polynomial
number of receive antennas n′r = poly(nt). We show in
Section III, however, that in fact for
mα < cn′r/
√
log n′r,
(which does not violate (4)) for some constant c, there ex-
ists an efficient algorithm (Zero-Forcing linear receiver) for
MIMO− Search. Since (4) is independent of the number of
receive antennas n′r, the condition (4) turns out to be not
sufficient to provide security of the MMPLC− 13. We will
provide our detailed analysis in Section III.
D. Security Condition of the Cryptosystem in [3]
The security of the cryptosystem provided in [3] is claimed
based on the hardness of MIMO− Search problem, explained
above. However, the hardness conditions are different from
that of [2]. In Theorem 1 of [3], a polynomial-time com-
plexity reduction is claimed from worst-case instances of
the GapSVPnt/α and SIVPnt/α problems in arbitrary lattices
of dimension nt, to the MIMO− Search problem with nt
5transmit antennas, noise parameter α and constellation size
m, assuming the following two hardness conditions hold:
m ≥ nr2nt log lognt/ lognt , (5)
and
nrα ≥ 2pi√nt. (6)
Notice that the number of transmit antennas n, signal con-
stellation M -PAM, and the number of receive antennas m
in [3] are simply replaced by our notations nt, m-PAM,
and nr, respectively. Furthermore, the second condition (6)
is originally nrα/k2 ≥ √nt, where k/
√
2pi is the standard
deviation of the entries of the channel gain matrix H. However,
without loss of generality and for simplicity, we assume
k =
√
2pi, which results in (6).
III. ZERO-FORCING ATTACK ON CRYPTOSYSTEM IN [2]
In this section, we introduce a simple and efficient at-
tack based on ZF linear receivers [10] to the MMPLC− 13
cryptosystem of [2]. In particular, we show that user E can
employ an efficient algorithm (that is ZF linear receiver) on its
received signal and decode the plain-text x with overwhelming
probability. Such an algorithm implies that MIMO− Search
problem is not hard as it is claimed in [2]. We first introduce
the attack and analyze its components. The eavesdropper E re-
ceives y′ = Gvx+e′. Let Gv = U′Σ′(V′)t be the SVD of the
equivalent channel Gv . Thus, we get y′ = U′Σ′(V′)tx + e′,
where both U′ and V′ are orthogonal matrices and Σ′ equals
diag (σ1(Gv), . . . , σnt(Gv)) = diag (σ1(G), . . . , σnt(G)),
where the last equality holds since the singular values of Gv
and G are the same. Note that E knows Gv and its SVD
from the assumption that (s)he knows the channel between A
and B. At this point, user E performs a ZF attack [10]. S(he)
computes
y˜′ = (Gv)−1y′ = x + e˜′, (7)
where e˜′ = (Gv)−1e′ = V′(Σ′)−1(U′)te′. User E is now
able to recover an estimate x˜′i of the i-th coordinate xi of
x, by rounding: x˜′i = dy˜′ic = dxi + e˜′ic = xi + de˜′ic. Let
v′i = (v
′
i,1, . . . , v
′
i,nt
) denotes the i-th row of V′, we define
σ2ti , m
2α2
nt∑
j=1
|v′i,j |2
σ2j (G)
. (8)
A. Analysis of ZF Attack
We now investigate the distribution of e˜′ in (7).
Lemma 1: The i-th component of e˜′ in (7) is distributed as
Nσ2ti , for 1 ≤ i ≤ nt, where σ
2
ti is defined in (8). Furthermore,
if σ2E = maxi{σ2ti}, then
σ2E ≤ m2α2/σ2nt(G).
Proof: See appendix A.
The above explained ZF attack succeeds if |e˜′i| < 1/2 for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ nt. Let PZF [E|G] denotes the decoding error
probability that E incorrectly recovers x using ZF attack.
Based on Lemma 1, we have
PZF [E|G] ≤ ntPw←↩N
σ2
E
[|w| > 1/2]
≤ ntPw←↩N1 [|w| > |σnt(G)|/(2mα)] (9)
≤ nt exp
(−|σnt(G)|2/(8m2α2)) . (10)
By comparing (2) and (9), we see that the noise conditions
for decoding x by users B and E are the same if both
users have the same number of receive antennas n′r = nr
and the distributions of channels G and H are the same.
This implies that user E is able to decode under the same
constraints/conditions as B. Moreover, if n′r > nr, then the
adversary E is capable of decoding in the presence of stronger
noise.
Remark 3: We show that in case of considering the hardness
condition from [2], the upper bound (3) on the error probability
of legitimate decoder B is asymptotically equal to the upper
bound (9) on the error probability of the attacker decoder E
if the latter uses a ZF attack. One may object that the upper
bound in (1) is not sharp; indeed, the union bound can be
tightened to
nt∑
i=1
Pw←↩Nm2α2 [|w| > |σi(H)|/2] ,
and in general, the exact probability of incorrectly decoding
x by B is
1−
∏
i
(1− Pw←↩Nm2α2 [|w| > |σi(H)|/2]),
which might be less than the value in the above summation and
the one in (1). However, this looseness of the bound does not
significantly change our conclusions for the following reason.
Notice that B’s error probability is lower bounded as
Pw←↩Nm2α2 [|w| > |σnt(H)|/2] ≤ P [B|H] . (11)
Comparing the lower bound (1) with the upper bound (11) on
P [B|H] shows that the latter exceeds the lower bound by at
most a linear factor nt. Therefore, even taking the looseness of
the bound into account, if the parameters are chosen to make
the legitimate decoder’s error probability P [B|H] ≤ 1/nω(1)t
negligible (which is needed for the correctness of the system),
then our results (Lemma 1 and (9)) show that attacker de-
coder’s error probability P [E|G] is equivalent to P [B|H] and
that is ≤ nt · 1/nω(1)t ≤ 1/nω(1)t if n′r grows larger than nt,
and hence also negligible.
B. Asymptotic Probability of Error for Adversary
Before starting this section, we mention a Theorem from [6]
regarding the least/largest singular value of matrix variate
Gaussian distribution. This theorem relates the least/largest
singular value of a Gaussian matrix to the number of its
columns and rows asymptotically.
Theorem 1 ([6]): Let M be an s × t matrix with i.i.d.
entries distributed as N1. If s and t tend to infinity in such a
way that s/t tends to a limit y ∈ [1,∞], then
σ2t (M)/s→ (1− 1/
√
y)
2 (12)
6and
σ21(M)/s→ (1 + 1/
√
y)
2
, (13)
almost surely.
We now analyze the asymptotic probability of error for eaves-
dropper using a ZF linear receiver.
Theorem 2: Fix any real ε, ε′ > 0, and y′ ∈ [1,∞], and
suppose that n′r/nt → y′ as nt →∞. Then, for all sufficiently
large nt, the probability PZF[E] that E incorrectly decodes the
message x using a ZF decoder is upper bounded by ε, if
m2α2 ≤ n′r
((
1− 1/
√
y′
)2
− ε′
)
/ (8 log (2nt/ε)) . (14)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Comparing conditions (4) and (14), we conclude that if y′
exceeds a small factor at most logarithmic in nt, i.e. y′ =
O(log nt) we can have both conditions satisfied and yet The-
orem 2 shows that MIMO− Search can be efficiently solved,
i.e. this contradicts the hardness of the MIMO− Search prob-
lem conjectured in [2] to hold for much larger polynomial
ratios y′ = O(poly(nt)).
To analytically investigate the advantage of decoding at B
over E, we define the following advantage ratio.
Definition 1: For fixed channel matrices H and G, the ratio
adv , logP(B|H)
logP(E|G) , (15)
is called the advantage of B over E.
The above advantage ratio is suitable to capture the decoding
advantage of user B over E asymptotically as it uses log
function in its definition. In fact, it shows how faster the
probability of error decays for user B than user E. Note that
such an advantage can be re-written for specific decoding
algorithms too. For example, in the framework of MMPLC,
user B will always experience a diagonal channel and hence
can decode x using a method explained in Subsection II-B.
If user E uses a ZF linear receiver (as discussed so far), the
advantage ratio with respect to ZF attack is:
adv =
σ2nt(H)
logPZF(E|G) , (16)
which is upper bounded by
advZF ,
σ2nt(H)
σ2nt(G)
, (17)
since (3) and (10) hold. We note from (2) and (9) that advZF
is the ratio between the maximum noise power tolerated by
B’s ZF decoder to the maximum noise power tolerated by E’s
ZF decoder, for the same decoding error probability in both
cases. First, we study this advantage ratio asymptotically. We
use Theorem 1 and substitute the obtained limits into (16) to
get the following result.
Proposition 1: Let Hnr×nt be the channel between A and B
and Gn′r×nt be the channel between A and E, both with i.i.d.
elements each with distribution N1. Fix real y, y′ ∈ [1,∞],
and suppose that nr/nt → y and n′r/nt → y′ as nt → ∞.
Then, using a SVD precoding technique in MM− PLC, we
have
advZF → (√y − 1)2 /
(√
y′ − 1
)2
almost surely as nt →∞.
Note that advZF → 1 is obtained in the case that y = y′, which
is equivalent to nr/n′r → 1. On the other hand advZF → 0, if
y′/y =∞ which is equivalent to n′r/nr →∞.
Remark 4: Note that the above defined advantage ratio
captures an analytical attack on MIMO− Search problem and
consequently MMPLC− 13. For numerical results/analysis of
such an attack, we refer the reader to [4] and [9].
C. General Precoding Scheme
One may wonder whether a different precoding method
(again, assumed known to E) than used above may provide
a better advantage ratio for B over E. Suppose that instead
of sending x˜ = Vx, user A precodes x˜ = P(H)x, where
P = P(H) is some other precoding matrix that depends on
the channel matrix H. Then, given the channel matrices, the
analysis given in Section III shows that using ZF decoding,
B’s decoding error probability will be bounded as
nt exp
((−σ2nt(HP)) / (8m2α2)) ,
while E’s decoding error probability will be bounded as
nt exp
((−σ2nt(GP)) / (8m2α2)) .
Therefore, in this general case, the advantage ratio of max-
imum noise power decodable by B to that decodable by E
under a ZF attack at a given error probability generalizes from
(16) to
advZF , σ2nt(HP)/σ
2
nt(GP). (18)
We now give an upper bound on the advantage ratio (18). Let
us first define
advupZF , σ21(H)/σ2nt(G).
Proposition 2: Let H and G be as in Proposition 1. Then
we have advZF ≤ advupZF. Furthermore, fix real y, y′ ∈
[1,∞], and suppose that nr/nt → y and n′r/nt → y′ as
nt → ∞, so that n′r/nr → y′/y , ρ′. Then, using a general
precoding matrix P(H) in MM− PLC, we have
advupZF → (
√
y + 1)
2
/
(√
y′ − 1
)2
almost surely as nt → ∞. Hence, in the case n′r = nr and
y′ = y →∞, we have advupZF → 1. Moreover, if advupZF →
c for some c ≥ 1, then min(y′, ρ′) ≤ 9.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 5: Notice that to derive the results of Proposition 1
and 2 we have used the randomness of channels H and G. It
means that our results show that advZF → 1 and advupZF → 1
for the average-case in cryptographic senses (for a definition
see [19]). This simply implies that our analysis are also valid
and might get stronger for the worst-case scenario, as worst-
case is always worse that the average-case.
7IV. THE CRYPTOSYSTEM IN [3] IS INCORRECT
We first note that the updated MMPLC− 17 is that the basic
system model is still the same, only the parameter choice
(hardness conditions) for noise magnitude and constellation
size has changed. Consequently, our analysis, which applies to
the general model, for any choice of parameters, still applies.
In particular, it still shows that user B has essentially no ZF
MIMO decoding advantage over user E when user E has
the same (or bigger) number of receiving antennas. Further-
more, we next show that the new larger noise/constellation
parameter only makes unique MIMO decoding by either user
E or B information-theoretically impossible (not just com-
putationally intractable), thus the MIMO cryptosystem design
MMPLC− 17 is cryptographically incorrect. In particular, we
show that user B cannot uniquely decode a sent message from
A, due to the large noise level imposed by the design to ensure
security.
The updated MMPLC− 17 in [3] works similar to that
of [2]. However, to ensure security, the number of transmit
antennas nt, constellation size m, and the number of receive
antennas nr should satisfy the following constraints:
m ≥ nr2nt log lognt/ lognt , (19)
and the modified noise condition is
nrα ≥ 2pi√nt. (20)
Note that in [3], the constellation size is denoted by M
and m represents the number of receive antennas nr. The
latter is chosen by a user or a system to trade-off the noise
requirement for constellation size m. If the noise level is below
a certain threshold, efficient decoding methods such as ZF
linear receiver can attack the system again. This was studies
at length in previous section. Since the constellation size m
is directly related to the decoding complexity and the security
of the system, if the above conditions are not met, the results
of [3] cannot provide any insight on the claimed security of
MMPLC− 17. We now give two results, which will prove
useful in our analysis of MMPLC− 17. The first one is the
Minkowski’s First Theorem [1].
Theorem 3: Let ΛH be a lattice generated by columns of
Hnr×nt , then λ1(Λ) = O(
√
nt) det(ΛH)
1/nt .
The second result finds an upper bound on the statistical
distance (total variational distance) between a Gaussian distri-
bution and its shifted one. The proof of the following result can
be easily found by combining equations (8) and (10) of [20].
Lemma 2: Let Ns2 be a Gaussian distribution with zero
mean and standard deviation s and Ns2,γ be γ +Ns2 (a shift
of all samples of Ns2 by a constant γ), then
∆(Ns2 , γ +Ns2) = O(γ2/s2).
We now show that user B cannot uniquely decode the plain-
text message x from its received signal considering the hard-
ness conditions imposed to ensure security. At one hand, we
multiply both sides of (19) by α and then combine the obtained
inequality with the second condition (20). It yields:
mα ≥ 2pi2nt log lognt/ lognt√nt. (21)
On the other hand and based on Theorem 3, the approximate
minimum distance of the lattices generated by G or H are
in the order of O(√nt) with overwhelming probability when
nr = poly(nt). Combining the above two arguments imply
that, the noise standard deviation mα is sub-exponentially
larger, by the factor η(nt) = 2nt log lognt/ lognt , than the
approximate minimum distance of both lattices G and H. Note
that this is not in contrast with neither (19) nor (20). Therefore,
both the legitimate user B and the adversary E are now in
trouble decoding the plain-text message x, since the received
signal will fall outside a correct decoding sphere (centered
at a lattice point with radius max{λ1(ΛH)/2, λ1(ΛG)/2})
with high probability. In particular, the following result is
outstanding:
Proposition 3: For any fixed H and x, the statistical distance
∆ between Hx + e and H(x + v1) + e for e i.i.d. Gaussian
with standard deviation mα, and v1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) is sub-
exponentially negligible.
Proof: It is obvious that the ∆(Hx + e,H(x + v1) + e)
is less than or equal to the SD between Hv1 + e and e,
because of the common term Hx. The latter itself is less than
or equal to nr∆(e1, γ + e1) where e1 is an 1-dimensional
Gaussian (because the nr components of e are independent),
where γ is an upper bound on the components of Hv1. In fact
γ = O(log nr) with high probability, since the nr components
in each column of H have standard deviation O(1). Now,
based on Lemma 2, the statistical distance ∆(e1, γ + e1)
between a Gaussian with standard deviation mα and its shift
by γ is O(γ2/(mα)2). Consequently, for nr = O(poly(nt)),
we have that ∆ = O(nr log(nr)/η(nt)) = 1/2Ω(nt/ lognt) is
sub-exponentially negligible for this scenario. Hence, even the
legitimate user B cannot uniquely decode x under these new
conditions.
Since the statistical distance between Hx+e and H(x+v1)+
e is sub-exponentially small, the legitimate user may decode
either to x or x + v1. Same ambiguity in decoding raises for
vj = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), where there is a single 1 at the j-
th position and 0 elsewhere, and therefore user B can decode
to either x or x + vj , 1 ≤ j ≤ nt.
V. DISCUSSION ON POTENTIAL OF MMPLC
The results of the previous sections on both MMPLC− 13
and MMPLC− 17 are summarized in Table I. It is now obvi-
ous from this Table that both MMPLC− 13 and MMPLC− 17
have some issues associated to them, the first one has got
security issues, while the second one (the updated one) does
not seem to have the security problem but cannot deliver a
unique message to the legitimate user. However, we still see
potential in MMPLC approach. We discuss/discover in more
details some properties of MMPLC by changing some design
criterion.
The analysis of Section III shows that one cannot hope to
achieve an advantage ratio greater than 1, if the adversary
uses a number of antennas significantly larger than used by
the legitimate parties (by more than a constant factor). We
now explore what advantage ratio can be achieved if we add
a new constraint to MMPLC, namely the number of adversary
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SUMMARY OF OUR RESULTS IN SECTIONS III-IV.
Reference Correctness Condition Hardness Condition(s) Hard Problem Attack
MMPLC− 13 in [2] |e˜i| < |σi(H)|2 ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ nt mα >
√
nt MIMO-Decision ZF attack (Section III)
MMPLC− 17 in [3] |e˜i| < |σi(H)|2 ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ nt
nrα >
√
nt and
m ≥ nr2nt log lognt/ lognt MIMO-Search Correctness issue (Section IV)
antennas is limited to be the same as the number of legitimate
transmit and receive antennas. That is, we study the advantage
ratio when the channel matrices H and G are square matrices
and not rectangular. We show that under this simple constraint
n = nt = nr = n
′
r, the advantage ratio can get larger than 1
and as big as O (n2). We employ the following result in our
analysis.
Theorem 4 (Th. 5.1, [6]): Let M be a t × t matrix with
i.i.d. entries distributed as N1. The least singular value of M
satisfies
lim
t→∞P
[√
tσt(M) ≥ x
]
=
(1 + x) exp
(−x2/2− x)
2x
. (22)
We note that for a similar result on the largest singular value
for square matrices, Theorem 1 is enough. Using the above
Theorem along with Theorem 1, one can further upper bound
and estimate the advantage ratio. More precisely, we have
advZF ≤ σ21(H)/σ2n(G) (23)
→ 4n/σ2n(G) = 4n2/
(
nσ2n(G)
)
, (24)
where (23) is obtained based on (38). As n → ∞, based on
Theorem 4, the denominator of the RHS of (24) is O(1) except
with probability ≤ ε for any fixed ε > 0, and thus advZF is
O (n2) with the same probability. The following proposition
is now outstanding.
Proposition 4: Let ε > 0 be fixed, H and G be n × n
matrices as in Proposition 1 with n = nt = nr = n′r. Using
a general precoder P(H) to send x, the maximum possible
advZF that B can achieve over E, is of order O
(
n2
)
, except
with probability ≤ ε.
The above proposition implies that user B may be able to
decode the message x, with noise power up to n2 times
greater than E is able to handle. Such an advantage was not
available in MMPLC scheme proposed in [2] due to the lack
of constraint on the number of receive antennas for E and the
use of SVD precoder.
In the following, we present the achievability of results
in Proposition 4, i.e. we show that the MMPLC technique
can approach the maximum achievable advZF of order O
(
n2
)
with nt = nr = n′r and an inverse precoder. This inverse
precoder is definitely not power efficient as it needs huge
power enhancement at the transmitter, however it gives us
a benchmark on the achievable advantage ratio. Notice that
such a precoder would not be practical at all in the sense
of Telecommunication theory, however it proves useful in
theoretical sense as it shows that the upper bound on advantage
ratio is in fact sharp.
Throughout the rest of this section we assume two con-
straints
nt = nr = n
′
r and P(H) = H
−1. (25)
The equivalent channel between legitimate users is the identity
matrix and the channel between users A and E is GH−1.
Thus, we have {
y˜ = Inx + e˜,
y′ = GH−1x + e′,
Note that, for this framework the advantage ratio (16) under ZF
decoding algorithm at user E can be written as 1/σ2n
(
GH−1
)
.
We now proceed to find the distribution of σ2n
(
GH−1
)
, when
both G and H are square standard Gaussian matrices of
dimension n.
We say that a random variable x has a distribution pro-
portional to function D, if the x is distributed as c0D for a
constant c0. We first find the distribution of GH−1.
Theorem 5: Let Q = GH−1, where H and G are two
n× n real Gaussian matrices.
• The distribution of Q is proportional to
1/ det
(
In + QQ
t
)n
. (26)
• The joint probability density function of the eigenvalues
of the product matrix W = QQt is proportional to
n∏
`=1
w
− 12
` (1− w`)−
1
2
∏
1≤j<k≤n
(wk − wj), (27)
Proof: See Appendix A.
We now state the Selberg integral sn(λ1, λ2, λ) from [27],
[28], which is defined as∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0
n∏
`=1
wλ1` (1−w`)λ2
∏
1≤j<k≤n
(wk −wj)2λdw1 · · · dwn
and equals
n−1∏
j=1
Γ(λ1 + 1 + jλ)Γ(λ2 + 1 + jλ)Γ(1 + (1 + j)λ)
Γ(λ1 + λ2 + 2 + (n+ j − 1)λ)Γ(1 + λ) , (28)
where Γ(x) denotes the Gamma function.
The following theorem shows that using the setting of
(25), the decoding advantage advZF of legitimate user B over
adversary E with respect to ZF attack approaches within
a constant factor the upper bound O(n2) on advZF from
Section III-C, with probability arbitrarily close to 1.
Theorem 6: Let ε > 0 be fixed, H and G be n×n Gaussian
matrices as in Proposition 1 with n = nt = nr = n′r. Using
an inverse precoder P(H) = H−1 to send x, the decoding
advantage with respect to zero-forcing attack advZF, is at least
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4 log(1/ε) ·
(
n2 + n
)
= Ω
(
n2
)
, except with probability ≤ ε,
for sufficiently large n.
Proof: See Appendix A.
An astute reader now asks why using ZF linear receiver
anymore, whereas there are more powerful MIMO decod-
ing algorithms including successive interference cancellation
(SIC) [23] and maximum likelihood (ML) decoders [17]? In
the next subsection, we address this question and show that
using the setting of (25), the advantage ratio with respect to
SIC is again non-trivial (in particular approaches O(n)). We
further show that since n is chosen to be the security parameter
in MMPLC, it is essentially not practical to employ high-
complex algorithms such as [17] neither for legitimate user
nor for the adversary.
A. Adversary with SIC
We now consider that user E performs successive in-
terference cancellation (SIC) [23]. Let us also assume that
GH−1 = Q = OR be the QR decomposition of the
equivalent channel, for an orthogonal matrix O and an upper
triangular matrix R with diagonal elements rjj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Then the received vector by user E equals y′ = ORx + e′.
Upon receiving y′, this user multiplies it by Ot, to obtain
y′′ = Oty′ = Rx + Ote′. Hence, we get{
y˜ = Inx + e˜,
y′′ = Rx + Ote′ = Rx + e′′,
In SIC decoding framework, the last symbol is decoded first,
i.e.
x˜′n = by′′n/rnne = xn + be′′n/rnne
is an estimate for xn. The other symbols are approximated
iteratively using
x˜′j =
⌊
y′′j −
∑n
k=j+1 rjkx˜
′
k
rjj
⌉
,
for j from n − 1 downward to 1. The error performance of
such a decoder depends on the components of the diagonal
entries of the R matrix. In other words, the above mentioned
SIC finds the closest vector if the distance from input vector
to the lattice is less than half the length of r2nn/2.
In order to investigate the advantage of decoding at B over
E under SIC decoding algorithm, we define the following
advantage ratio:
advSIC , r2nn(I)/r2nn(Q), (29)
is called the advantage of B over E under SIC attack. Since
r2nn(I) = 1, the advSIC = 1/r
2
nn(Q). We now derive the
exact distribution of the diagonal entries of the matrix R and
specially the distribution and expected value of r2nn(Q). We
cite the following theorem from [21]:
Theorem 7: Let Q be an n × n random full-rank matrix
with probability density function P . If Q = OR, where R,
rjj > 0 an upper triangular matrix and O is an orthogonal
matrix, OOt = In, then R and O are independent and the
probability density function of R is
c0
n∏
j=1
rn−jjj P
(
RRt
)
, (30)
for a constant c0.
Using the above theorem along with Theorem 5, we observe
that the probability density function of R is proportional to
n∏
j=1
rn−jjj det
(
In + RR
t
)−n
. (31)
We will make use of the following lemma from page 28 of [24]
in the proof of the next theorem.
Lemma 3: Let u and v be columns of length n and A be
a square matrix of order n, then
• For a scalar a, we have
det
([
A u
vt a
])
= a det
(
A− uvt/a) .
• The following equality holds:
det
(
A + uvt
)
= det(A) + vtadj(A)u,
where adj(A) denotes the adjoint of A.
A random variable v is said to have a beta distribution of the
second type (beta prime distribution) BII(a, b) if it has the
following probability density function
va−1(1 + v)−(a+b)/β(a, b), v > 0,
where both a and b are non-negative and β(a, b) is the beta
function [21]. The following theorem is now outstanding.
Theorem 8: Let the matrices Q, O, and R be as
in Theorem 7. Then r2jj are independently distributed as
BII ((n− j + 1)/2, j/2), for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In Figs. 2-4, we show both the histogram of r2jj and the
probability density functions of BII ((n− j + 1)/2, j/2) for
different j’s equal to 10, 40, and 90 for 106 square channel
matrices of size n = 100. It is easy to check that these figures
match perfectly suggesting the validity of Theorem 8. The
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Fig. 2. The histogram and the theoretical p.d.f. of r2jj (red line) for j = 10
and 106 square channels of size n = 100 using inverse precoder.
above calculation of a closed-form formula for the distribution
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Fig. 3. The histogram and the theoretical p.d.f. of r2jj (red line) for j = 40
and 106 square channels of size n = 100 using inverse precoder.
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Fig. 4. The histogram and the theoretical p.d.f. of r2jj (red line) for j = 90
and 106 square channels of size n = 100 using inverse precoder.
of the diagonal elements of R in the QR decomposition of
Q enables us to find the advSIC of user B over E under
SIC decoding algorithm. Since the equivalent channel between
users A and B is I, the legitimate user can successfully decrypt
the encrypted data. Next, we analyze the asymptotic behavior
of advSIC.
Theorem 9: Let Hn×n be the channel between A and B
and Gn×n be the channel between A and E, both with i.i.d.
elements each with distribution N1. Then, using the setting of
(25) in MMPLC, we get advSIC = O (n).
Proof: See Appendix A
Note that the above result implies that n/ω(1) ≤ advSIC. On
the other hand, since r2nn(Q) ≥ σ2n(Q), we get advSIC ≤
advZF, which was itself upper bounded by n2. This means that
by using the computationally more complex (and of course
non-linear) SIC decoding algorithm, user E can gain more
advantage over user B compared to when it uses ZF linear
receiver. However, the lower bound derived in Theorem 9
implies that there is still security left even if user E employs
a much stronger decoder than linear receivers. Next we show
that user E basically cannot employ a maximum likelihood
(ML) decoder due to exponential dependency of the computa-
tional complexity of such algorithms to the dimension, n, of
the Massive MIMO channel.
B. Adversary with Sphere Decoder
Let us assume that user E has access to an optimal maxi-
mum likelihood (ML) decoder such as a sphere decoder [17].
Since we found the closed forms of distributions of the upper
triangular matrix R in the QR decomposition of Q, we can
lower bound the complexity of a maximum likelihood (ML)
decoder such as the ones presented at [25], [17] to find the
encrypted data at user E. In such algorithms the coordinates
of the closest lattice vector are enumerated. Consider a basis
{q1, . . . ,qn} of the lattice ΛQ with generator matrix Q.
Based on a heuristic analysis [26], one can see that the
cost of enumeration is lower bounded by hn/2, which is
approximately lower bounded by
hn/2 ≥ 2Θ(n)nn8 +o(n). (32)
Hence using a ML decoder at user E in MMPLC scheme is
prohibited if the number of antennas n is in the order of few
hundreds, which is the case in Massive MIMO setup.
VI. SUMMARY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
A Zero-Forcing (ZF) attack has been presented for the
massive multiple-input multiple-output MIMO physical layer
cryptosystem (MMPLC− 13) in [2]. A decoding advantage
ratio has been defined and studied for ZF linear receiver. It
has been shown that this advantage tends to 1 employing
a singular value decomposition (SVD) precoding approach
at the legitimate transmitter and a ZF linear receiver at the
adversary. Our generalized upper bound on legitimate user
to adversary ZF decoding advantage suggests the complexity-
based approach does not remove the needed linear limitation
on the number of adversary antennas versus the number of
the legitimate party antennas, that is also suffered by previous
information-theoretic methods.
The basic system of the updated MMPLC− 17 in [3] is
essentially the same as the one in [2] with different parame-
ters for noise magnitude and constellation size as hardness
conditions. In this paper, it has also been shown that the
MMPLC− 17 is cryptographically incorrect meaning it cannot
deliver a unique message to the legitimate user. We also note
that our ZF analysis can be applied to the this general model,
for any choice of parameters. In particular, we have shown
that the user B has basically no ZF MIMO decoding advantage
over user E when user E has the same (or bigger) number of
receiving antennas.
We then turn our attention to the case, where all parties
has the same number of antennas n. It is been proven under
this circumstance, an advantage ratio in the order of n2 is
achievable. Although the proposed scheme would not be power
efficient at all, one line of research is to design more power
efficient precoders achieving maximum possible advantage
ratio. If eavesdropper employs a stronger decoder algorithm
such as a successive interference cancellation (SIC), then
the advantage ratio will be reduced to a constant fraction
of n. Our positive result for the inverse precoder suggests
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that if the adversary is limited to have the same number
of antennas as the legitimate parties, the complexity-based
approach may provide practical security. This suggests the
following questions: Can a security reduction from a worst-
case standard lattice problem be given for this case? How does
the practicality of the resulting scheme compare to existing
physical-layer security schemes based on information-theoretic
security arguments? Can the efficiency of those schemes be
improved by the complexity-based approach?
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: Note that (U′)te′ has the same
distribution as e′ since (U′)t is orthogonal. Hence, zj , the j-th
coordinate of the vector z = (Σ′)−1(U′)te′ is distributed as
Nm2α2/σ2j (G), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ nt. We also note that zj’s are
independent with different variances. We find the distribution
of
ti = 〈v′i, z〉 =
nt∑
j=1
v′i,jzj , (33)
where 〈v,w〉 , vt ·w for a row vector v and a column vector
w. Since the linear combination of independent Gaussian
random variables is again a Gaussian distributed random
variable, ti in (33) is distributed as
nt∑
j=1
v′i,jNm2α2/σ2j (G) = N∑ntj=1 |v′i,j |2m2α2/σ2j (G) (34)
= Nm2α2∑ntj=1 |v′i,j |2/σ2j (G). (35)
Since σ2j (G) ≥ σ2nt(G), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ nt, the random
variable ti is distributed as Nσ2ti with
σ2ti =m
2α2
nt∑
j=1
|v′i,j |2
σ2j (G)
≤ m
2α2
σ2nt(G)
nt∑
j=1
|v′i,j |2 =
m2α2
σ2nt(G)
,
(36)
where the last equality holds because V′ is orthogonal.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let G be the set of all channel
matrices G such that
σ2nt(G) ≥ n′r
((
1− 1/
√
y′
)2
− ε′
)
.
Note that G 6∈ G with vanishing probability o(1) as nt →∞,
by Theorem 1. We have:
PZF[E] =PZF[E|G ∈ G]P [G ∈ G]+PZF[E|G /∈ G]P [G /∈ G]
≤ PZF[E|G ∈ G] + P [G /∈ G]
≤ ntPw←↩N1 [|w| < |σnt(G)|/(2mα)] + o(1)
≤ nt exp
(−σ2nt(G)/ (8m2α2))+ o(1)
≤ nt exp
(
−n′r((1−
√
1/y′)2 − ε′)
8m2α2
)
+ o(1), (37)
where in the first inequality we used P [G ∈ G]≤1 and
PZF[E|G /∈ G]P [G /∈ G] ≤ P [G /∈ G] ,
the second inequality is true based on (9) and Theo-
rem 1, the third inequality uses the well-known upper bound
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exp
(−x2/2) for the tail of a Gaussian distribution and the last
inequality follows from the definition of G. By letting (37) be
less than ε, the sufficient condition (14) can be obtained.
Proof of Proposition 2: It is easy to see (please refer to
17-8, 7.(c) of [22]) the two inequalities below hold for every
H, G, and P:{
σnt(HP) ≤ σ1(H)σnt(P),
σnt(GP) ≥ σnt(G)σnt(P).
Hence, the advantage ratio (18) can be upper bounded as
advZF ≤
σ21(H)σ
2
nt(P)
σ2nt(G)σ
2
nt(P)
=
σ21(H)
σ2nt(G)
= advupZF. (38)
Using Theorem 1 for the numerator and the denominator of
the RHS of (38), respectively, and nr/n′r → y/y′, we get
advupZF →
y(1 +
√
1/y)2
y′(1−√1/y′)2 =
( √
y + 1√
y′ − 1
)2
.
In the case n′r = nr and y = y
′ → ∞, the lat-
ter inequality gives advupZF → 1. Also, the inequality(√
y + 1
)2
/
(√
y′ − 1)2 ≥ 1 implies (using y = y′/ρ′) that
ρ′ ≤ 1/(1− 2/√y′)2, and the RHS of the latter is ≤ 9 for all
y′ ≥ 9, which implies min(y′, ρ′) ≤ 9.
Proof of Theorem 5: We prove each part separately
• The proof follows the same lines of the proof of Theorem
4.2.1 of [21]. The joint density of G and H is propor-
tional to
etr
(− (GGt + HHt) /2) ,
where etr(M) = exp (Tr (M)) for a matrix M. Changing
the variable from G to Q, it follows that the Jacobian
J (G→ Q) (for a definition, please see page 12 of [21])
is equal to |det(H)|n and hence the joint density of H
and Q = GH−1 is proportional to
etr
(− ((I + QQt)HtH) /2) |det(H)|n ,
where to get the above equation we have used the fact
that Tr(NM) = Tr(MN) for matrices M and N. Now
integrating out H (using multivariate Gamma integral
(see equation (1.4.6) of [21])) yields the density of Q
proportional to (26).
• We now study the eigenvalue distribution of the product
matrix W = QQt, which proves useful later in finding
an achievable upper bound on the advantage ratio. By
changing the variable from Q to W, which introduces a
factor of det(W)1/2 (since J (Q→W) = det(W)1/2)
and then from W to its eigenvalues {λj} and the eigen-
vectors, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we see that the joint eigenvalue
distribution has the explicit functional form proportional
to
det(W)−
1
2
n∏
`=1
1
(1 + λ`)
n
∏
1≤j<k≤n
(λk − λj), (39)
for λ` ≥ 0. Since det(W)− 12 =
∏n
`=1 λ
− 12
` , the above
equation (39) and hence the eigenvalue distribution of W
is proportional to
n∏
`=1
λ
− 12
` / (1 + λ`)
n
∏
1≤j<k≤n
(λk − λj). (40)
By further changing the variable w` = 11+λ` , for 1 ≤
` ≤ n, the joint probability density function (40) is
proportional to
n∏
`=1
w
− 12
` (1− w`)−
1
2
∏
1≤j<k≤n
(wk − wj), (41)
where in (41) the exponent −1/2 of w` was in fact
deduced from n− 2 + 1/2− (n− 1), for which the term
n is from 1/(1 + λ`)n, the term −2 contributed from
the Jacobian of the transformation from λ` to w`, for
1 ≤ ` ≤ n, the term 1/2 has appeared due to λ−1/2` ,
and finally −(n − 1) is from the multiplications of the
denominators of the second term in (40) as∏
1≤j<k≤n
(λk − λj) =
∏
1≤j<k≤n
(1/wk − 1/wj)
=
n∏
`=1
w
−(n−1)
`
∏
1≤j<k≤n
(wk − wj).
With this substitution, it is now easy to check that 0 ≤
w` ≤ 1, since λ` ≥ 0 (due to non-singularity of Q and
positive definiteness of W) and also w1 ≤ · · · ≤ wn
because λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λn.
Proof of Theorem 6 We compute the probability that
the advZF be less than a polynomial function G(n),
P [advZF ≤ G(n)]. Based on the definition of the advZF, we
get
P [advZF ≤ G(n)] = P
[
σ2n(In)/σ
2
n
(
GH−1
) ≤ G(n)]
= P
[
σ2n (Q) ≥ 1/G(n)
]
= P [λn (W) ≥ 1/G(n)] (42)
Let us now define
w , G(n)/(1 +G(n)), (43)
hence, we get:
P [λn ≥ 1/G(n)] = P [1/wn − 1 ≥ 1/G(n)] = P[wn ≤ w]
= P[w1 ≤ w, . . . , wn ≤ w] (44)
=
∫ w
0
· · ·
∫ w
0
c
n∏
`=1
w
− 12
` (1− w`)−
1
2
∏
1≤j<k≤n
(wk − wj)dw1 · · · dwn, (45)
≤ cw n(n−1)2
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0
n∏
`=1
y
− 12
` (1− y`)−
1
2
∏
1≤j<k≤n
(yk − yj)dy1 · · · dyn, (46)
for a constant c (independent of n) where (44) is true because
of the ascending order in w` and (46) is obtained based on the
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change of variable from w` to y` = w`/w and the fact that
(1− w`)−
1
2 = (1− wy`)−
1
2 ≤ (1− y`)−
1
2 w−
1
2 , (47)
as w ≤ 1. In particular, w < 1 based on its definition in
(43) and limG(n)→∞ w = 1. Note that wn(n−1)/2 in (46)
follows from the change of variable in
∏
1≤j<k≤n(wk − wj)
as there are exactly n(n−1)/2 elements in this multiplication
and the Jacobian wn got canceled by two w−n/2’s in w−1/2`
and the inequality in (47). The last term in (46) equals
sn (−1/2,−1/2, 1/2). Hence by substituting (28) into (46)
and then (42), it follows that
P [advZF < G(n)] ≤ cw
n2−n
2 sn (−1/2,−1/2, 1/2)
= c′w
n2−n
2 , (48)
where c′ = csn (−1/2,−1/2, 1/2). We claim that c′ = 1. To
see that, it is easy to plug in w → 1 in the integrations (44)-
(46) and note that the inequality in (47) becomes equality for
w → 1. We get P[w1 ≤ 1, . . . , wn ≤ 1] = c′(1)(n(n−1)/2.
On the other hand, since w` ≤ 1, for 1 ≤ ` ≤ n, P[w1 ≤
1, . . . , wn ≤ 1] = 1, which implies that c′ = 1 or equivalently
c−1 = sn (−1/2,−1/2, 1/2). Therefore, we have,
P [advZF < G(n)] = (1/(1 + 1/G(n)))(n
2−n)/2
≤ exp(−(n2 − n)/(4 ·G(n))), (49)
where in the last step we used the inequality 1+2x ≥ exp(x)
for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2, and that G(n) ≥ 1 for sufficiently large n.
We now distinguish between three cases: (i) if G(n) = cGn for
a constant cG. As n→∞, then (49) goes to 0. (ii) if G(n) =
cGn
2 for a constant cG. As n→∞, then (49) goes to e−1/cG .
And finally (iii) if G(n) = cGn3 for a constant cG, then by
letting n → ∞, we get (G(n)/(1 +G(n)))(n2−n)/2 → 1.
The proof is now complete by taking the second case and
verifying that the right hand side of (49) is ≤ ε when G(n) ≤
1
4 log(1/ε) · (n2 − n).
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Fig. 5. The numerical values of P
[
nr2nn(Q) < x
]
for different dimensions
n = 10, 50, and 100 for 10000 square channels of size n = 100 using
inverse precoder.
Proof of Theorem 8: Let us first find det (In + RRt).
Since R is an upper triangular matrix, it can be written as:
R =
[
R11 r
0t rnn
]
.
It turns out that det (In + RRt) can be expanded as what
is given at the top of next page, where (39) and (40) are
obtained based on the first and the second parts of Lemma 3,
respectively. In the latter case, we choose A = In−1,
u = (1 + r2nn)
−1 (In−1 + R11Rt11)−1 r,
and v = r and the facts that det (In−1) = 1 and adj (In−1) =
In−1. Substituting (40) into (31), the joint density of R11, r,
and r2nn is
J
(
R11, r, r
2
nn
)
= J1 (R11) J2
(
r2nn
)
J3
(
r|R11, r2nn
)
,
where J1 (R11) is defined as
c1
n−1∏
j=1
rjj
n−1∏
j=1
r
(n−1)−j
jj det
(
In−1 + R11Rt11
)−(n−1)
,
J2
(
r2nn
)
, c2
(
r2nn
)1−1 (
1 + r2nn
)−1−n/2)
,
and J3
(
r|R11, r2nn
)
is defined as
c3
(
1 + r2nn
)−n/2+1
det
(
In−1 + R11Rt11
)−1(
1 + (1 + r2nn)
−1rt
(
In−1 + R11Rt11
)−1
r
)−n
,
for appropriate constants c1, c2, and c3. It is now easy to see
that J2 is proportional to a beta distribution of second type as
BII (1/1, n/2). By further changing the variables:{
r′n = r
2
nn,
t′ = (1 + r2nn)
−1
2 rt (In−1 + R11Rt11)
−1
2 ,
with the Jacobian
2 (r′n)
−1
2 (1 + r′n)
n−1
2 det
(
In−1 + R11Rt11
) 1
2 ,
we get that r2nn is independent of R11, which itself has the
same distribution as R with n replaced by n−1. By recursively
decomposing the joint distribution J and its independent
components J1, J2, and J3, we further find the distributions
of the other r2jj for n− 1 ≤ j ≤ 1 as beta distributions of the
second type as BII ((n− j + 1)/2, j/2).
Proof of Theorem 9: We start by computing the
P
[
r2nn ≤ n/ω(1)
]
. We have the following Chebyshev’s in-
equality:
P
[
r2nn − E
[
r2nn
]√
V [r2nn]
≤ t
]
≥ 1− 1
t2
. (41)
Since r2nn is distributed based on BII
(
1
2 ,
n
2
)
, it follows that
E
[
r2nn
]
=
1
2
/
(
n
2
− 1
2
)
= 1/(n− 1) = O (1/n) . (42)
and
V
[
r2nn
]
=
(1/2) (1/2 + n/2− 1)
(n/2− 1) (n/2− 2)2 = O
(
1/n2
)
. (43)
Substituting these into (41), we get
P
[
(r2nn − ce/n)/(cv/n) ≤ t
] ≥ 1− 1/t2, (44)
for constants ce and cv independent of n. The above inequality
is equivalent to P
[
r2nn ≤ (tcv + ce)/n
] ≥ 1−1/t2. By letting
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det
(
In + RR
t
)
= det
([
In−1 0
0t 1
]
+
[
R11 r
0t rnn
] [
Rt11 0
rt rnn
])
= det
([
In−1 0
0t 1
]
+
[
R11R
t
11 + rr
t rnnr
rnnr
t r2nn
])
= det
([
In−1 + R11Rt11 + rr
t rnnr
rnnr
t 1 + r2nn
])
= det
((
1 + r2nn
) (
In−1 + R11Rt11 + rr
t
)− r2nnrrt) (39)
=
(
1 + r2nn
)
det
(
In−1 + R11Rt11 +
(
1− r2nn(1 + r2nn)−1
)
rrt
)
=
(
1+r2nn
)
det
(
In−1+R11Rt11
)
det
(
In−1 + (1 + r2nn)
−1 (In−1 + R11Rt11)−1 rrt)
=
(
1 + r2nn
)
det
(
In−1 + R11Rt11
) (
1 + (1 + r2nn)
−1rt
(
In−1 + R11Rt11
)−1
r
)
, (40)
tcv+ce = ω(1), we get P
[
r2nn ≤ ω(1)/n
] ≥ 1−o(1). On the
other hand P
[
r2nn ≤ ω(1)/n
]
= P
[
1/r2nn ≥ n/ω(1)
]
, which
completes the proof. See Fig. 5 for a plot of 1 ≤ x ≤ 10
versus P
[
nr2nn < x
]
.
